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Wu Jieh-min
[email protected]
CfCC and Institute of Sociology, NTHU

 
 

[Note: This is a very rough draft. Comments are welcome. Please do not quote without the presenter's prior consent.]

 
 

I

 
 

The "status quo" is a social and political construction of the reality. Various perspectives are competing for the interpretation of the cross-Strait developments.

 
 

My question: Is it sustainable for Taiwan to purse democracy, progress, security, and prosperity without seriously taking account of the "China factor"?

 
 

People in Taiwan have contrived to achieve freedom and democracy under the shadow of China and without the recognition of being a sovereign nation. This has been a major of source of collective anxiety. China, as a menace for some people and as a hope for others, is a most disturbing and dynamic factor for the island's democratic prospects. From a "realist" perspective, the anxiety of being stuck in the "status quo" won't be easily solved in the foreseeable future. As a matter of fact, we have been enduring the status quo for more than three decades since the Shanghai Communiqu was signed in the early 1970s.

 
 

Recently, as public referendum is hailed as a way to deepen democracy and the national elites began to seize this opportunity to engage in a war of political rhetoric, Bush was worried that Taiwan is going to change the "status quo" unilaterally and thus warned both sides across the Strait: don't rock the boat; neither war, nor TW independence. Bush's warning was getting on the nerves of the Taiwanese. For us, what does the "status quo" mean? And what do people have in their minds about the "status quo"?

 
 

[1] Taiwan has being enjoying a de facto independence under the Pax Americana. As long as we don't provoke, the US will honor its commitment of defending TW. That is to say, the status quo is imagined as a long-term security and stability.

 
 

[2] Under the current of globalization and the rising of China, the trade and investment links with the mainland will inevitably enthrall TW in the cage of Greater China: The status quo is moving toward the side of China.

 
 

[3] As long as TW continues its path toward democratization meanwhile intensifying the Taiwan-centered political identity, we are gradually sailing away from China. This is another projection of the status quo.

 
 

Before we move on, let's see some facts and numbers:

  • In recent years, China has become the single largest export market of Taiwan. The investment-driven trade has also resulted in increasing social and cultural exchanges.
  • Intermarriage is also significantly increasing: 16 of every 100 new couples have spouses from China in 2002. According a poll by the Commonwealth Magazine（天下雜誌）in Dec. 2003:
  • 42.6％ of the Taiwanese have friends or relatives working in China; 19.2％ are considering finding a job in China; 13.2％ are considering sending their children to China for education; and 27.9％ are considering letting their children work in China.
  • Meanwhile, 51.8％ of the respondents think that Taiwan's economy has relied upon China to a worrisome degree.
  • In terms of unity/independence in the long run, 56％ wish the status quo be maintained; unity as a choice has dwindled to 9.8％, while the support for independence has increase to 22％.
The data shows a complicated picture of the public opinion.

 
 

II

 
 

Now, we can examine the three images of the status quo in combination with the above data.

 
 

[1] The first image is by and large consistent with survey data above. It reflects that TW's reliance on the US military protection is deeply embedded in the regional politics. However, this imagination is one without historicity. The so-called status quo won't be frozen in a time capsule. It is a complacent mentality of living under Pax Americana, assuming that the US hegemony will remain unchallenged for a long time. Even the assumption turns out to be true, there's no guarantee that the "American national interest" will always go hand in hand with that of Taiwan. Just think about how the KMT-ROC was "abandoned" by the Nixon administration.

 
 

[2] The second image induces the following calculus: "Time will be on our side if we cut off the trade and investment links with China, or at least obstruct the rapid flows. On the contrary, if we don't do something now, time is running against us." President Lee Tenghui's "curbing policy" (戒急用忍) was a product of such an image. However, it was like a "moral persuasion" to the capitalists, rather than a substantiated policy, retrospectively.

 
 

[3] The third image reflects the people's confidence in democracy. The political opening has offered us with freedom and abundant choices. In the meantime, the era of democratization has also witnessed a sea-change of national identification. See the following table:
 Time of interview   (1) Taiwanese   (2) Chinese   (3) Chinese/Taiwanese 
 1990/05/29   18%   59%   19% 
 1998/07/03   55%   27%   13% 

Sources: Survey Center of the United Daily

 
 

As shown by the survey data, TW has been cruising away from China in terms of the national identity. The paradox of the coexistence of a lopsided Taiwanese identity and a "realistic" choice of status quo seems to be well explained by the sheer fact of China's military threat. However, in the everyday politics, the three projections are intertwined.

 
 

III

 
 

Now, back to the point of departure: Is it sustainable for Taiwan to purse democracy, progress, security, and prosperity without seriously taking account of the "China factor"? I'm afraid not. Just remind yourself of the missile threat during the first direct election of the president in 1996 and the recent disturbance caused by the referendum debate.

 
 

Moreover, a deeper social anxiety is still haunting us: Since the end of Cold War, the economic links have been getting closer among China and Taiwan, meanwhile Taiwan as a whole has been steering away from China on the political front and national identification.

 
 

There is the distinction of high politics and low politics in IR theory. Presumably, high politics always predominates low politics. But this understanding of the nature of international politics could cause troubles for us if we take it unreflectively. If we want to liberate ourselves from the collective anxiety, should we not keep distance with the thinking of high politics and give the social spheres more weight in projecting our own future?

  • Security dilemma is causing more military buildup on the both sides under the imperative of national security.
  • The imperative of national security is adding fuel to the ethnic animosity and national identity crossfire domestically.
  • The national security discourse is obstructing deeper socio-democratic reforms. For instance, should we not treat the Chinese spouses equally as the Taiwanese nationals? Or at least offer them the same equal rights as offered to the spouses from other nations (Vietnam, Indonesia, etc.).

 

Because of the overwhelming and unproductive discourse of national security, the social anxiety has been channeled into the mentalities and hence policies of passive defense, which is basically an introvert self-protection of the society. Can we turn it into a positive, creative anxiety? We need to transform ourselves from the perspective of state-centered security into that of society-centered security: A new conception of "social security." That is, to re-imagine the cross-Strait affairs from the angle of society; and to advocate progressive social movements on a common denominator of Taiwan's liberty and autonomy.

 
 

IV

 
 

Following the above shifted perspective, I propose some points for deliberation:

  • It is compatible and desirable for us to pursue a good and democratic life in the island and to concern ourselves with China' prospect for freedom and democracy, esp. in the areas of human rights and social movements and workers' conditions.
  • This concern comes fundamentally from the society instead of from the strategic thinking based on national security. In so thinking, we need to distinguish the Chinese society from the repressive state and Beijing regime. Consequently, we will dialog with the Chinese people, not with the ruling apparatuses. Of course, we are not so naive as to underestimate the real threat of the Chinese state toward TW autonomy/independence. As yet, there is no a priori reason for the both peoples to alienate from and rival with each other.
  • Therefore, it is desirable to help construct a cross-Strait public sphere, in which to link with the progressive movements on both sides, thereby creating conditions for mutual understanding and cooperation. The public sphere should be further linked up with the emerging global civil society.
  • In essence, we should try to build our autonomy through a collective cognitive turn: from the introvert passive defense to a new horizon of activism. With the advance of democratization and increasing Taiwanese identity, we have confidence in such an active engagement. Rather than losing our subjectivity, the new thinking and new movements will bring in resilience, tolerance and cultural diversity to our country.

 
 

I fully understand that it's not an easy enterprise to create a shift of perspective, which is premised on a shift of values. Historically, such a process is never smooth. We need to involve more citizens and a group into the public forum, to which today's roundtable belongs.