Back

Note: This article represents the view of the author and not the University of Hong Kong. An abridged version in Chinese is published concurrently by Ming Pao Monthly.

Atypical pneumonia is ravaging all over Hong Kong. Is it the cause or effect of SARG's governance crisis? From a lateral point of view, we may need to analyze the popularity of the government as concentric circles centering on the Chief Executive. From a longitudinal point of view, we will need study the ups and downs of their popularity in the past 18 months.

CE Tung Chee-hwa first entered the danger zone in September 2001, when his popularity rating went below the benchmark of 50. However, from December 2001 to July 2002, he recovered himself, as he engineered for his second term of office by admitting some mistakes, and pledged to be more responsive. That "honeymoon" period was quickly disrupted by his hasty introduction of the accountability system, the credibility of which was soon crushed by the "penny-stocks fiasco". Instead of facing the problem head-on, Tung prolonged the problem by postponing the announcement of his Policy Address for three months, in order to buy time for all parties to get "on track".

Between August 2002 and January 2003, Tung gradually drifted away from the general public as his popularity rating dropped below 50 marks again. The governance crisis has moved one step closer. Then, from January 2003 onward, Tung's popularity was hard hit by people's disappointment in his belated Policy Address, in the Financial Secretary's Budget Speech, and worse still, in the sudden eruption of FS's car-purchase scandal, and the outbreak of atypical pneumonia. Tung's rating staggered at no more than 45 marks for three consecutive months, and there is no way he could command people's respect. The plunge in Tung's popularity was paralleled by the decline in the government's credibility (as shown in the chart).

One feature of Tung's administration, in terms of public support, is weak in the central. Across all 13 principal officials of the accountability system, CE and FS are now on the bottom, and the Directors of Bureaux enjoy more public support than CE and the three Secretaries. Another feature of the administration is the lack of cohesion of the system as a whole. Through the introduction of senior officials alien to the civil service culture, and the degrading of employment terms for the grassroots, solidarity of the system was gradually eroded.

An encroaching governance crisis has already come upon our government, and the way it handled the SARS epidemic clearly bore this out. To begin with, a leadership core lacking public support could hardly command applause from the public no matter what it does. The public would rather devote their sympathy and gratitude to the medical workers fighting at the frontline. Secondly, the government has always put itself in a hopeless dilemma by making volatile decisions. The suspension of classes and taking quarantine measures are two such examples. Thirdly, Tung seems to be very fond of making hollow promises, and not willing to admit mistakes. Finally, Tung is very subservient to Mainland leaders, and dares not say "no". It was only after being summoned on April 13 by President Hu Jintao, who himself took an open attitude amidst internal pressure, that Tung finally had the nerve to admit that the epidemic was not yet under control.

The SARS calamity could have been a golden opportunity for Hong Kong to demonstrate its worth to the motherland. The level of professionalism demonstrated by our medical workers, microbiologists and journalists, the degree of transparencies within our own government system, and the international connection of our entire society, could have helped China a lot. However, our CE's accustomed reliance on the backing and blessing from the Mainland has crippled our own advantages. The governance crisis facing the HKSAR Government is a stumbling block hampering the development of "one country, two systems".