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Note: This article represents the view of the author and not the University of Hong Kong.

Before discussing the "actual situation" of political reform's pre-conditions in Hong Kong, the author has to first state that, he is disappointed about the interpretation of the Basic Law by the National People's Congress (NPC). He is also disappointed about the veto on universal suffrage in 2007/08 before Hong Kong people formally start the discussion on political reforms. As far as the author knows, many intellectuals who sincerely wish to contribute their expertise on political reforms are also disappointed. This is the actual situation.

The author is disappointed, not just because there will be no universal suffrage, but also because the Central People's Government (CPG) has not seized the opportunity to establish communication and mutual trust with the general public. The author has once said, if the political reforms are handled well, it can help to boost people's confidence in "one country, two systems" and increase people's trust in the CPG gradually. It can also help to console the sentiment of Hong Kong people towards the June Fourth Incident. However, the fact is that, the CPG does not trust Hong Kong people and has wasted an opportunity in establishing mutual trust with Hong Kong people. This is another actual situation.

According to Article 45 and Article 68 of the Basic Law, the selection methods of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress, with universal suffrage as the ultimate aim. The questions are: (1) Who defines the "actual situation"? (2) How to define the "actual situation"? and (3) What is really the "actual situation"?

The first question: Who defines the "actual situation"?

As a matter of fact, the CPG has already given the answer, that is the CPG itself. The NPC has vetoed universal suffrage based on its understanding on the "actual situation", without consulting Hong Kong people. This was done so as to demonstrate that the NPC is the most authoritative state agency, which has absolute power to interpret the "actual situation". Whether or not the NPC's practice is appropriate, the author wishes to leave this question to legal experts to discuss. The author, however, must point out two problems here.

(1)

According to the understanding of many Hong Kong people, no matter it is correct or not, judging from its composition, the NPC is seen more as a political than legal body. Just as Qiao Xiao-yang, the NPC Standing Committee's Deputy Secretary-General, said after a seminar with the Hong Kong's legal sector on April 8, as significant differences exist in the two legal systems, how the two systems would integrate with each other remains a big lesson.

(2)

Going beyond the legal level, there is also a question of legitimacy of the ruling power. In this respect, whether or not the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation and ruling can win the support of the public has to be proved by public opinion figures. The actual situation in Hong Kong is that, the image of the NPC and its representatives are not satisfactory. Li Peng, the former NPC Chairman, has always scored very low marks in POP's opinion survey conducted by the author. This is also part of the "actual situation".

This brings out the second question: How to define the "actual situation"?

In the author's view, if the CPG and the HKSARG can adopt a pragmatic and "people-centered" attitude to listen to Hong Kong people' views, then they should conduct more objective and scientific surveys and have direct dialogues with people. The CPG should not frequently resort to the ideology and start hostile attacks. The author always believes that, if the CPG can keep its ears open and widen the discussion space, Hong Kong people will also respect the opinions of the CPG. Thus, a win-win-win situation will be derived among the CPG, HKSARG and Hong Kong people.

Last of all, the third question: What is really the "actual situation" of political reform's pre-conditions in Hong Kong? The author will use four sets of public opinion figures to answer this question.

(1)

As a matter of fact, Hong Kong people love the country and Hong Kong very much, but not the Chinese Communist Party. According to the most recent figures from POP, an average of 75% Hong Kong people claimed they love the country, 94% Hong Kong people claimed they love Hong Kong, 85% Hong Kong people claimed they love the Chinese nation, but only 24% claimed they love the Party (Table 1). Aren't the Hong Kong people's active participation in the Diao Yu Tai Movement, relief to the people in Hua Dong's flood and enthusiastic support to the national team very good examples? The intent of "one country, two systems" is to set aside the question of whether loving the country means loving the Party, until history sees fit to have it resolved. Yet, the CPG has launched the debate on loving the country and the Party before starting the discussion on political reform in Hong Kong. This is an unwise move.

(2)

After the handover, Hong Kong people's confidence towards the CPG has already grown gradually, from just above 30% to once over 50%. This in fact signals a rather good relationship. The public has more trust in the CPG than the HKSARG. Also, people's satisfaction rate on the People's Liberation Army has reached 56% (Table 2). Both are very good indicators. The CPG should not let them go easily.

(3)

Although a majority of Hong Kong people support universal suffrage in 2007/08, only around 20%-30% of people believe universal suffrage can be materialized in 2007/08 (Table 3). Therefore, the public has in fact reserved ample space for discussions and manoeuvres. The CPG's and its representatives' high-profile opposition against Hong Kong people's voices of universal suffrage will only lead to adverse impact.

(4)

After the NPC's interpretation, all the confidence and trust indicators have dropped. This reverses the whole upward trend (Table 4). The author estimates that, this downward trend will continue for some time. Judging from the public opinion figures, the CPG has already paid a huge price, which is even bigger when compared with the first interpretation of the Basic Law by NPC in June 1999. Therefore, remedial work should be carried out as soon as possible.

The author would like to conclude by making a suggestion.

The author suggests that the CPG should have direct dialogues with the public, intellectuals and professionals, and indirectly through the HKSARG or other spokesmen. The CPG should understand, there are historical reasons behind the distrust of Hong Kong people in the CPG. The responsibility is not on Hong Kong people. When Hong Kong people participated in the June Fourth memorial activities and the July 1 demonstration, they all hold one same belief, that there will be a better future for our nation.

Today's Hong Kong may well be China tomorrow.

Table 1: The extent of Hong Kong people's love towards their country

Table 2: Hong Kong people's impression on the People's Liberation Army

Question: Are you satisfied with the performance of the People's Liberation Army?

Table 3: Hong Kong people's opinions towards general elections

Table 4: Hong Kong people's confidence and trust indicators

Note
* "95% confidence level" means that if we were to repeat a certain survey 100 times, using the same questions each time but with different random samples, we would expect 95 times getting a figure within the error margins specified.
** Collapsed from a 5-point scale.
^ Average overall response rate.
^^ Average sampling error of percentages.
# Because the questionnaire used in early March contained questions on functional constituencies, the figures reported here may have been slightly affected.