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Note: This article represents the view of the author and not the University of Hong Kong.

In the Policy Address delivered last week, CE Tung Chee-hwa made an unprecedented move by mentioning President Hu Jintao's name, followed by a brief reference to the views of "Mainland legal experts". In paragraph 77 of his Policy Address, Tung said:

"When I was on my duty visit in Beijing recently, President Hu pointed out to me the serious concern and principled stance of the CPG towards the development of Hong Kong's political structure. Thereafter, some Mainland legal experts and certain individuals in Hong Kong have also expressed their views on the matter. We definitely need to understand the full implications of these important issues, before making appropriate arrangements for the review of constitutional development."

Then, at the press conference held afterwards, Tung for the first time used the term "four legal masters" to replace "Mainland legal experts", hence lifting their status to a level just under the Central leaders. Tung said:

"…On December 3, during my duty visit to Beijing, President Hu Jintao told me that he was very concerned with Hong Kong's constitutional review. On the next day, the "four legal masters" also expressed their views, and a wide spectrum of opinions have emerged in Hong Kong. Regarding constitutional review, especially those stipulated in the Basic Law, we must first understand and clarify everything. It is wise to have a thorough understanding before proceeding to conduct the review. This is also a very good step…"

From the record, of the seven Policy Addresses already made by Tung, other than this year's mention of Hu, Tung has only made reference to the name of a Chinese leader once, in the introduction of his first Policy Address delivered in 1997. At that time, Tung said in paragraph 3:

"…The 15th Party Congress under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin has just set out the goal of building China into a major power by the middle of the 21st Century. Our country has bright prospects from which Hong Kong is sure to benefit..."

By mentioning Jiang in 1997, Tung declared his mandate, as well as returned favour to Jiang for handpicking him as the CE. This time, Tung mentioned Hu not only to declare his mandate again, but to shift the responsibility of procrastinating the launching of constitutional review onto the Central Government.

There is no doubt that Hu and the "four legal masters" did raise their concerns, otherwise, Tung will not have the guts to make such a remark. On the same day of Tung's policy speech, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office swiftly issued a statement in support of the Policy Address, which signifies that the Central Government has indeed made its stand known to Tung.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that, the fact that the Central leaders have to publicize their stand through Tung and the "four legal masters" not only proves that Tung is incompetent in his governance, but also bears the risk of paying a political price - that of weakening Hong Kong people's confidence in "one country, two systems".

The author has recently written some articles on Hong Kong people's confidence in "one country, two systems" since 1993. According to the figures, Hong Kong people's receptiveness of "one country, two systems" over the past decade or so could by and large be divided into three stages. Stage One from 1993 to 1996, Stage Two between 1997 and 1998, and Stage Three from 1999 to 2003.

During the first stage, the confidence and no-confidence levels usually wrestled with one another between 35% and 45%, probably a result of the fierce wrangle between the Beijing and British Governments before the handover. In the latter half of 1993, when the Sino-British negotiations finally broke down, and the Chinese Government openly announced its intention to "build its own stove", Hong Kong people's confidence in "one country, two systems" fell to record low. It was only until mid-1994, when the controversy surrounding Chris Patten's constitutional reforms finally settled, and quarrels died down between the Chinese and British Governments because each promised to do things its own way, that people's confidence gradually recovered.

The second stage started some time around late 1996, when Tung was selected as the first Chief Executive, up to the latter half of 1998. During this period, a series of blunders made by the SAR Government erupted one after another, and people's support to the government kept declining. However, because there was no sign of interference in local affairs by the Central Government, people's confidence in "one country, two systems" surged, from 45% to 67%.

However, from 1999 to now, which is the third stage of the development, the general public's confidence in "one country, two systems" has been fluctuating downwards, from 67% to 49% registered in the first half of 2003, before it finally stabilized. The critical turning point occurred in 1999, when the SAR Government sought for the interpretation of the relevant articles of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in order to settle the right of abode issue. Such a move eroded the final adjudication power of Hong Kong, and completely reversed the upward momentum of people's confidence. It also marked the first wave of downturn. The second wave of decline started in early 2002, when Tung sought support from the Central Government for his re-appointment, in spite of his plunging popularity. The Central Government headed by Jiang once again took a high hand to support Tung, and started to say this and that about Hong Kong matters. Meanwhile, a rumor spread out from the Tung administration that the Central Government had already set July 2003 as the deadline for implementing Article 23 of the Basic Law. It stirred up public anger, and people's confidence in "one country, two system" dropped further. It finally triggered 500,000 people to take to the streets on July 1, 2003. Fortunately, the Central Government led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao answered people's demands voiced on July 1 with an open attitude, and people's confidence in "one country, two system" became stable again.

On a macro level, regarding people's confidence in "one country, two system" over the past 11 years, the author believes that Tung is indeed the primary cause for the decline in people's confidence, whereas the Central Government's role has been rather passive, for three reasons:

(1) The interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPC in 1999 totally reversed the upward trend of Hong Kong people's confidence in "one country, two systems". Using the "four legal masters" as a protective shield for the first time, the Central Government was actually using them as spokesmen, out of good intention, to avoid interfering local affairs. What matters more is that, it was actually the Tung administration which insisted on requesting NPC for re-interpretation of the Basic Law, which put the Central Government in a stark dilemma. Long before the Court of Final Appeal made its ruling on the right of abode issue, Tung himself had pronounced his position that Hong Kong could not accommodate all mainland-born children of Hong Kong citizens. At that time, no research data was available, and the academics and experts had yet to discuss the issue. Tung was just too eager to show his loyalty to the Central Government by making a precious offer.

(2) At the end of 2001, as Tung engineered for his second term of office amidst his record low popularity, he sought help from the Central Government once again. Jiang of course supported Tung, as a matter of face-saving. Unfortunately, Tung then adopted an execrable strategy of sweeping off 700 odd nominations, therefore making the election obsolete, even though it was only a small-circle election. Tung has in effect introduced the concept of "vote-to-vote" election from Mainland to Hong Kong, which was one step backwards in Hong Kong's democratic development. This could not have been the intention of the Central Government.

(3) On July 5, after the July 1 Demonstration, Tung still stubbornly adhered to the original timetable for legislating for Article 23 of the Basic Law. This was sheer nonsense, and was an utter dismissal of what could have been a violent outbreak on July 9. Had James Tien not resigned, and a social catastrophe emerged, Tung would be full responsible.

Be they deliberate tactics or sheer stupidity, these three moves of Tung had absolutely no regard for public interest, they also framed up the Central Government. Without any understanding of the public sentiment, how can Tung bridge up Hong Kong people with the Beijing leaders? As for the Central Government's many misinterpretations and misjudgments of the democratic demands of Hong Kong people, Tung is undoubtedly to be blamed for.

In the new round of constitutional discussions, Tung have put Hu and the "four legalmasters" on the table, again eroding the trust between Hong Kong people and the Central Government. Tung has repeatedly stressed that Hong Kong's development needs the backing of the Mainland, it is actually a camouflage for his personal dependence on the Central Government, both politically and psychologically. He is in fact taking advantage of the Beijing leaders. The Central Government fears democracy because of its own history and of specific situations in the Mainland. Tung fears democracy because of his political ignorance and shortsightedness.

If the Mainland legal experts truly want to examine the legal basis of Article 45 of the Basic Law from a professional perspective, they can conduct professional studies and seminars in conjunction with other Mainland, local and overseas legal experts. Hong Kong people would certainly welcome this move. In open societies, academic-experts are academic-experts. If academic-experts become government spokesmen, their remarks will go beyond the boundaries of academia and profession, and there is no need for the public to judge the meticulousness and trustworthiness of such remarks from a professional angle. Mainland experts and the Central Government may not agree with this, but Tung cannot keep a blind eye on it.

If the Central Government is going to use "four legal masters" as its spokesmen again, in order to escort Tung, the general public and the Central Government will have everything to lose.