Back
Robert Ting-Yiu Chung (Director of Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong) |
|
Translation assisted by Calvin Chun-Kit Chan (Research Executive, Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong) |
|
Note: This article represents the view of the author and not the University of Hong Kong. |
|
One full year has passed since CE Tung Chee-hwa announced the list of Principal Officials under the accountability system on June 24 last year. Before putting into practice, such a revolutionary system should have clearly spelled out the exact meaning of "accountability", the criteria of appointment and dismissal of officials, and their connection with public opinion, if any. An appropriate dismissal mechanism should also have been clearly set out. As it turned out, precious time has been wasted, by the society and the principal officials themselves, in striving for "integration" and "adaptation". One commentator even went so far as to say that the harshest punishment for poor performers was their loss of credibility and a jeopardized career. In other words, no dismissal mechanism was really necessary. |
|
On the day when CE Tung Chee-hwa announced his team of the Principal Officials, a reporter asked him, "Could you explain to us a clear standard on how to define an Official's performance as being good or bad? Under what circumstances would an Official be accountable to the public and step down?" |
|
So answered Tung, "I suppose the people in Hong Kong would soon be able to draw their own conclusions. What is a good job and what is bad… If you ask me here, 'How would the Officials be made responsible for their own blunders?' I would like to stress that, I would not make any decision merely to win applause. But I also want to make it clear that, if there are serious blunders, particularly matters concerning integrity, I will definitely take action." |
|
At the Swearing-in Ceremony on July 1 last year, Tung said: "For the Second Term Government, with the introduction of the Principal Officials Accountability System, we will ensure that there is a clear delineation of power and responsibility to improve our effectiveness and that measures adopted are fully implemented. We must adopt a new style of governance, feel the pulse of the community, take community sentiments fully into account, and enable different sectors of the community to participate extensively in the policy-making process, so that Government policies will reflect properly the concerns and expectations of the people". Tung then promised to strengthen the Government's work on collecting and analyzing public opinion. |
|
According to the author's observation, when Tung implemented the system a year ago, he probably wanted to enhance the public's scrutiny of the Government. However, due to the hasty introduction of the system, incidents like the "penny-stocks fiasco", the "car purchase scandal", and the "SARS outbreak" erupted one after another, even before Tung knew how to set up a definite mechanism. One year has now gone by. |
|
Exactly how could the Principal Officials be accountable to the general public? The author believes that opinion data which are open and internationally compatible provide an important reference. The author has already discussed the methods of measurement before, in his previous article on the popularity of the Chief Executive. The rating scale of 0-100, as contrasted to "approval rates", "support rates" and "vote shares" have been discussed. This article focuses on whether the same measurement could be applied to the Principal Officials under the accountability system. |
|
Although our CE was not popularly elected, there have to be a standard when comparing the popularity of leaders around the world. Moreover, according to the Basic Law, the ultimate aim of the selection of the CE is "by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures". Therefore, using "hypothetical voting" as an indicator of CE's popularity is just for keeping pace with our own development. However, the measurement of the Officials' popularity could be another matter. |
|
To begin with, the Basic Law did not mention the "Principal Officials under the accountability system", let alone their mandate from the people. Second, according to the CE, all 14 Officials were directly appointed by him, thus they should be accountable to him in parallel. "Accountable to public opinion" actually meant the legitimacy of the entire system and individual Officials without any legal provision. It might not be very meaningful to use the question of "Would you vote for so-and-so if there is a general election tomorrow?" to measure their popularity, because such election scenarios would not be relevant. |
|
In light of this, since the implementation of accountability system, the author has chosen three types of survey questions to test the popularity of various Officials, concurrently and alternately. Now that almost one year has passed, all findings are released. The three questions are: |
|
(1) |
Please rate your support of so-and-so, using a 0-100 scale. 0 stands for absolutely no support, 100 stands for absolute support, 50 stands for half-half. How would you rate so-and-so? |
(2) |
Do you think so-and-so is doing a good or bad job (in his/her post)? (5-point scale) |
(3) |
If you had the right to vote on the reappointment or dismissal of so-and-so tomorrow, how would you vote? |
The author has written before that in the West, the rating scale of 0-100 is rarely used, because the ratings could not be directly converted into vote shares in elections. Opinion surveys are more often than not called "opinion polls" in Western democracies, because it implies the concept of a referendum. Explaining social phenomenon using survey findings would be of lower priority. Among the three questions mentioned, Question (3) bears the closest meaning of a referendum. |
|
It follows that, although the Principal Officials were not popularly elected, if opinion data is needed when making decisions of reappointments or dismissals, people's "hypothetical voting results" should be most appropriate. Of course, all hypothetical questions involve assumptions, and the results may be different from those of a real election. Moreover, in real referenda, the method of determining which side has "won" or "lost", or whether the motion was "carried" or "defeated", must be clearly stipulated. Opinion polls, on the other hand, are just part of people's opinion in general. For example, the result of a referendum may be determined by a simple majority of the actual voters, or requires the approval of more than half of the entire electorate. Many charters and constitutions also require two-thirds majority before dismissing their own leaders. |
|
Having understood these limitations, we could somewhat conceptually divide the Principal Officials into 3 classes and 6 grades, according to the results of "hypothetical voting". One class of Officials would be those with "reappointment rate" exceeding 50%, another class would be those with "dismissal rate" exceeding 50%, while the remaining class would be those with both rates not exceeding 50%. As for the 6 grades, further consideration would be given to the direction of "voting results", and whether the watershed of 67% (two-thirds majority) is reached. Filling in the figures scored by the 14 Principal Officials early this month, the following results are obtained: |
|
(1) |
"Reappointment rate" over 67% -- Donald Tsang Yam-kuen |
(2) |
"Reappointment rate" between 50% and 67% -- Sarah Liao Sau-tung, Arthur Li Kwok-cheung |
(3) |
Both below 50%, with "reappointment rate" higher than "dismissal rate" -- Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, Henry Tang Ying-yen, Stephen Ip Shu-kwan, Patrick Ho Chi-ping, Michael Suen Ming-yeung, Elsie Leung Oi-sie, Joseph Wong Wing-ping |
(4) |
Both below 50%, with "dismissal rate" higher than "reappointment rate" -- Stephen Lam Sui-lung, Yeoh Eng-kiong, Frederick Ma Si-hang, Antony Leung Kam-chung |
(5) |
"Reappointment rate" between 50% and 67% -- No cases |
(6) |
"Dismissal rate" over 67% -- No cases |
The above figures were obtained from a random survey of Hong Kong people of age 18 or above. Not all of them were registered voters, and the "reappointment" and "dismissal" rates were calculated without excluding the respondents who "voted" for "abstention" or "don't know". The results would be bound to be different had an "actual referendum" actually took place. For example, Stephen Lam Sui-lung's total vote share for "reappointment" plus "dismissal" was only 41%, these "voting results" could have been nullified because it failed to reach the benchmark of 50% turnout. On the other hand, Antony Leung Kam-chung's "dismissal" vote would have exceeded 67% if all abstention votes were excluded, placing Leung at another level. |
|
All in all, should public opinion still be considered important, even for a system of reappointment or dismissal without the mandate of the people, the most straightforward answer is to monitor the popularity of the Principal Officials constantly and openly, by means of a variety of opinion indicators. When an Official's popularity is on the verge of bankruptcy, direct questions like "Should so-and-so resign?" should be asked. This is no political bluff, but simply the fulfilling of responsibility of the media and the pollsters. |
Table:Performance of the Principal Officials under the accountability system in terms of the three opinion indicators
0-100 support rating | Hypothetical vote share on reappointment | Hypothetical vote share on dismissal | Job performance approval rate | |
Chief Secretary for Administration Donald Tsang Yam-kuen |
63.6 | 71% | 5% | 54% |
Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works Sarah Liao Sau-tung |
60.9 | 59% | 3% | 45% |
Secretary for Education and Manpower Arthur Li Kwok-cheung |
56.3 | 52% | 11% | 35% |
Secretary for Economic Development and Labour Stephen Ip Shu-kwan |
55.5 | 46% | 7% | 28% |
Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology Henry Tang Ying-yen |
55.1 | 47% | 9% | 30% |
Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk- yee |
53.0 | 48% | 25% | 41% |
Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands Michael Suen Ming-yeung |
51.9 | 37% | 15% | 21% |
Secretary for Home Affairs Patrick Ho Chi- ping |
51.6 | 40% | 13% | 23% |
Secretary for the Civil Service Joseph Wong Wing-ping |
49.6 | 27% | 17% | 13% |
Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung Oi-sie | 49.0 | 30% | 27% | 20% |
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food Yeoh Eng-kiong |
46.6 | 29% | 38% | 21% |
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam Sui-lung |
43.8 | 18% | 23% | 9% |
Financial Secretary Antony Leung Kam- chung |
42.8 | 19% | 46% | 13% |
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury Frederick Ma Si-hang |
40.9 | 16% | 39% | 8% |