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Hsu Szu-chien |
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Referendum: Taiwan's Peaceful Nuclear Test |
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From a long-term perspective of international politics, the most important event that happens in Taiwan in 2004 will be the first referendum to be held, rather than the outcome of the presidential election or that of the two referendum questions. |
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Let's put aside the referendum's impact on and significance in the short-term domestic political wrestling. In view of Taiwan's situation in the international community, the referendum's significance lies in its long-term impact on Taiwan's strategic development. |
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The referendum is similar to nuclear weapons for Taiwan in the sense that its strategic significance affects the international interests and tactic choices of the surrounding countries. That is why Taiwan needs to formulate a new international strategy for the referendum. |
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Why do I compare the referendum mechanism to nuclear weapons? |
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First, nuclear arms development is a macro strategy that serves for decades to come, not for immediate use. |
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Second, different from traditional weapons, nuclear arms present a capacity of mass destruction against enemies. Yet, retaliation of the same scale is also possible. That is to say, to possess nuclear arms is to possess an intimidation measure that achieves a balance in terror with the enemies. Devastating damage can be unleashed on the offending country with the use of nuclear weapons. |
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Third, countries in the world can be roughly categorized to three: non-nuclear countries, small nuclear countries, and big nuclear countries. Countries without nuclear weapons capacity usually have different strategies from those with the capacity. Small nuclear countries also develop different strategies from their large counterparts. |
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Fourth, a country's use of nuclear weapons, threat to use them, or attempt to develop them usually invokes fierce reaction or even intervention from the world's strong powers and its nearby countries. A series of changes in international politics as well as changes in the regional or global strategic structure may follow as a result. |
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Then how is a referendum similar to nuclear weapons for Taiwan? |
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If Taiwan is under an external threat, it can use a referendum to safeguard its sovereignty and to nullify the foreign power's legitimacy to alter Taiwan's sovereign status. Although no large-scale physical damage will be put down by the act, the legitimate and democratic appeal will force the international community to attend to Taiwan's situation. The international influence will put the external force that poses threat to Taiwan in a dilemma -- either to continue to threaten Taiwan against the wish of the international community, or to cease the threat. |
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If Taiwan uses the referendum to change the status quo, then undoubtedly strong reaction can be expected from China and the US. The impact is equivalent to the detonation of a nuclear bomb. A referendum on Taiwan's sovereign status thus carries a political capacity no less than a small nuclear bomb, although no physical destruction is caused. |
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Taiwan Needs A New International Strategy for Using Referendum |
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The above analysis does not involve value judgment on the referendum that can change Taiwan's status. We do not need to analyze the undeniable fact that Taiwan has the referendum mechanism. What we need to analyze is how to use it. From a positive perspective, it is better to be equipped with a self-protection mechanism than without. Yet, possession of a more powerful mechanism also implies greater risk to be undertaken. Taiwan has to develop a new international strategic view on the referendum, an issue that will be faced by the president to be elected. |
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First, we should be aware of the international strategic significance implied by possessing the referendum mechanism. Second, with the knowledge of the potential impact of the mechanism on international politics, we should develop a set of strategies specifying how to use the mechanism under what circumstances. |
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As a nuclear country has a different strategic view from a non-nuclear country, Taiwan should develop a different strategic view since now we have the referendum mechanism. A country that uses nuclear arms with the mindset of a traditional weapons user will not be able to enjoy the privilege as a nuclear country. Even worse, the improper use of the nuclear weapons may result in harm to its own interests. |
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A Dilemma of the Referendum Strategy and Its Implications |
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There is, however, an embedded dilemma of the referendum. If, according to the pan-blue's idea, we use the referendum to protect ourselves only when the current sovereignty status of Taiwan is threatened externally, it would be too late to call for a referendum when the threat has been already imminent. Such a so-called "defensive referendum" may actually not be able to deter the invasion or the threat of invasion. However, if Taiwan takes the initiative to protect itself from a "perceived threat" before the external threat has actually wreaked the havoc, it may be perceived as provocative act by China, which in turn may invites China's invasive threats. |
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Since the referendum has such a fluid nature, to own the referendum actually has put Taiwan in an even more precarious situation. It has the tendency to strengthen the tendency of the escalation of conflict engendered by the security dilemma. On the Taiwan side, if President Chen is reelected, President Chen has declared that the referendum will be applied to create a new constitution. If Lien is elected, then DPP as the opposition party will have even less constraint to start a movement to mobilize a bottom-up referendum petition for a new constitution. It would be extremely difficult for the KMT-PFP government to stop it (because the would be criticized undemocratic). |
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On the Mainland China side, Beijing has already said that they oppose solving Taiwan's political status through referendum in Taiwan. However, given the fact that Taiwan already has the referendum, it would be more unpredictable whether Taiwan will make a move to alter Taiwan's political status at any moment. China would therefore tend to adopt a preemptive deterrence when she considers necessary. |
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If the previous analyses are valid, the implication of the referendum is that both Taiwan and Mainland China would face greater risks in the security dilemma. There are two implications: first, both sides thus would have greater need a solution to get out of it; second, however, it would be more difficult to find such a solution. |
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Under this circumstance, the paper comes up with the following policy recommendation: "peaceful doctrine of referendum." |
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Toward a Peaceful Doctrine of Referendum |
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The "peaceful doctrine of referendum" is composed of two elements: "deterrence to maintain peace as a passive reaction," and "active referendum to pursue peace." This paper argues, as referendum can be used to create uncertainty, it can also be used to create and maintain "peace." |
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When Taiwan is faced with external threat, military or diplomatic, we can appeal to referendum to reassure the status quo regarding our sovereignty, that is, Taiwan is an independent sovereignty with its name as ROC. By reassuring both to people in Taiwan and to the international community to maintain the status quo, we can strengthen the political bargaining status of our political leader in facing coercive threat, and thus deter any opportunistic and coercive attempt to undermine the status quo and rock the foundation of peace across the strait. |
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Furthermore, if China appeals to an incremental approach to raise the military pressure without starting a major attack, Taiwanese people can start a bottom-up movement to initiate a referendum on requiring China to cut down the missile. This would be a aggressive tactic in using referendum to pursue peace without having to change the status quo political status of Taiwan. |
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In short, the referendum in Taiwan is a powerful weapon in terms of its international impact. However, it does not have to be negative When properly used, it can create tremendous coercive or deterring power for maintaining peace. |