	Thomas P. Bernstein Columbia University

	All too often, the triangular relations between China, the US, and Taiwan are analyzed without taking into account the larger picture. This presentation attempts to do this by examining President Bush's overall approach to the world.

	The main point to be made is that there are two current in US foreign policy: one is a strong Wilsonian current which is favorable to Taiwan and whose neoconservative representatives are prepared to incur Beijing's anger. The second is a pragmatic (realist) current which places great importance on relations with the PRC. It too sympathizes with Taiwan's democracy but it is strongly opposed to unilateral initiatives by President Chen that might upset the status quo. The latter current has thus far won out.

	I. The Bush "revolution in foreign policy?" Foreign policy decision-making is a moving target, buffetted by changing circumstances and political divisions, the latter being strongly present in the Admistration. This necessarily qualifies judgements about "a" foreign policy. Still, I offer the following list of attributes:

	1. a preference for a hard line in foreign policy and for coercive instruments in lieu of the compromises that must be made in negotiations. An excellent example was Bush's rebuff to Kim Dae-jung on North Korea early in 2001;

	2. a willingness to take unilateral action even in the face of disapproval by close allies or of the international community. This is rooted in Bush's belief that longterm success requires clear resolve and will to use power. This includes waging preemptive war, if deemed necessary. The only way to insure its security is for the US to shed constraints imposed by friends, allies, and international institutions. In short, US security in the war of terror, which is the primary preoccupation of the Administrations rests on "America unbound," to quote the title of a recent book.

	3. a strong belief that the US must spread democracy, human rights, and free markets, which are the fundamental answers to the threat of terrorism. This orientation includes a strong strain of moralism ("axis of evil"), a commitment to the spread of American values and failure to grasp that others might doubt the purity of American motives by failing to recognize that the US "is the greatest force for good in history." It is Wilsonian idealism but with the hard edge of unilateralism and coercive diplomacy.

	4. A rhetoric and style that is belligerant, brusque, imperious, and contempuous, as of "old Europe" or the UN. This includes willingness to offend friends and allies.

	5. Overtime, this hardline approach has been modified, especially in the light of the Iraq quagmire, which requires international participation in the form of funds -reckless tax cuts undermine America's imperial pretensions-and troops. As of late, the US seems to have turned into a supplicant begging for help. A pragmatic approach has been adopted in East Asia, since the US can't invade North Korea and even lesser coercive steps such as a blockade are highly risky. Neo-conservatives want regime change in North Korea (and Iran), but destabilizing that regime may create so much fall out that it isn't really feasible. Hence the multilateral negotiations in which China plays a major role.

	II. Implications for the Taiwan issue

	Two aspects of the above are favorable to Taiwan. One is the idealist strain, which in the case of Taiwan's democracy is indeed shared widely in the US and is not confined to conservatives. Some who share this tendency, however, are not simply committed to the status quo but sympathize with Taiwan's aspirations to be independent, especially as long as there is a Communist dictatorship on the Mainland. PRC pressures on HK's democratization are likely to reinforce this view.

	The other is Bush's macho toughness, as exemplified by his remark on defending Taiwan, "whatever it takes." This may have created the impression in Taiwan that whatever Taiwan does is ok with the US, but a corrective was quickly issued following this pronouncement. Still, in any crisis involving Taiwan, strong sumpathies are likely to be voiced in US public opinion and within the Administration.

	A much longer list of factors suggests that Bush foreign policy is not favorable to Taiwan in the sense that there is no tolerance for Taiwan initiatives that threaten to bring about a crisis. First, as just noted, the US needs China's cooperation with respect to North Korea.

	2. The US also needs China with regard to the war on terror. The Administration regards China as an important player in this enterprise. It appreciated the prompt message of support from Jiang Zemin after 9/11. Maintenance of good relations is important from this perspective. Chinese intelligence sources are apparently helpful. The US doesn't want China to object to its military presence in Central Asia and is even willing to sanction PRC suppression of Muslim dissidents provided it can be dressed up as suppression of fundamentalists/terrorists.

	3. The Iraq crisis. Invading Iraq was simple; building a stable democracy is predictably turning out to be a frustrating, difficult, and costly enterprise (inter alia, US casualties, which the public has been willing to tolerate, but probably not indefinitely) enterprise. To some degree the Afghan situation is similar. This means that the US must cultivate allies and collaborators in its war on terror and it probably means the de facto abandonment of preemptive war except in very precisely defined circumstance.

	Above all, the continuing crisis in Iraq means that the US simply cannot afford another crisis elsewhere, especially since the Iranian and North Korean problems have not been resolved. If Chen initiatives are seen as dragging the US into an unwanted conflict, possibly causing loss of American lives, enthusiasm for Taiwan will rapidly cool. This is the reason behind President Bush' public rebuff to President Chen in the presence of Premier Wen Jiabao. To be sure, there hasn't much official criticism of CSB since the referendum, perhaps because its language has been softened. Chen's initiative aroused distrust in Washington, which is not a healthy development for US- Taiwan relations. Some see him as continuing to assume that the US will defend Taiwan whatever the circumstances, but in the current international situation it is extremely dangerous for President Chen if he does hold this view. Given the cold-blooded pursuit of US interests by the Bush Administration, interference with its strategy could backfire very badly. Whether this is likely can be debated: in an election year, Bush needs to secure his conservative base. But unilateral steps by CSB has already undermined the trust that is an essential component of US-Taiwan relations and further such steps will only deepen the distrust.

	4. Back to China. US-China relations have had their ups and downs. At present, however, while there are frictions, the overall relations, in the words of Secretary Power, "are the best they have been since President Richard M.Nixon first visited Beijing" (Powell, "A Strategy for Partnerships," Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb.2004). This is not only due to North Korea and the war on terror. It is also due to a shift in perceptions of the significance of China's rise, its growing stature in the world and its increasingly important role in world affairs. For the US, as Secretary of State Powell notes, China is one of the great powers in addition to Russia and India, with which the US needs to maintain good relations to insure worldwide stability. Formerly a "strategic competitor" it is now a de facto strategic partner.

	For its part, China has adopted an increasingly cooperative posture in the region, as well as with the world at large. It is "grudgingly" prepared to live with the reality of a unipolar world in which the US is predominant, provided that US hegemony is not misued to the detriment of China. Chinese statements emphasize the desirability of a cooperative relationship with the US and of minimizing friction.

	In Asia there has been a significant improvement in China's relations with Southeast Asia, as well as with China and Japan and India. China's role in the economies of the region is growing by leaps and bounds and is resulting in significant dependence on China's economy in SEA. This means that there will be less support for Taiwan in the region if Taiwan is seen as having precipitated a conflict in the Straits.

	In sum, in the American scheme of things, a Taiwan crisis is an obstacle to the attainment of its goals in Asia. This is a point that Taiwan's leaders need to understand.

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